tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post682310505988113969..comments2023-10-24T10:09:22.146+01:00Comments on The Yorkshire Ranter: Sunday Makhmut Gareev BloggingAlexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17153530634675543954noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-59361601183159442852009-03-03T11:26:00.000+01:002009-03-03T11:26:00.000+01:001) Police: get them better trained and get them do...1) Police: get them better trained and get them doing police work in the urban areas rather than fighting ACF in the mountains<BR/><BR/>2) ISAF: redeploy; concentrate on ensuring security in the cities and large towns<BR/><BR/>3) Narcotics: in the short term, buy up and destroy the poppy crop; in the medium term, complete overhaul of the eradication program, including financing for alternative crops<BR/><BR/>4) Political: set a definite deadline for withdrawal; make explicit the link between public order and the withdrawal of coalition troops<BR/><BR/>5) Other militias: bring OEF and other CTFs under unified ISAF controlAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-17057455958276138732009-03-02T17:24:00.000+01:002009-03-02T17:24:00.000+01:00Because I suspect that a lot of our current activi...Because I suspect that a lot of our current activity is counter productive. The only solution is a political solution, and our operational art must be redirected to make achieving it the first priority. Unlike the Soviets, we have the advantage that we're not fighting all over the country; resources should be concentrated militarily on the south half of the ring road, but most of all, on replacing western troops/contractors with Afghans.<BR/><BR/>The only operating mode where Afghanistan isn't at war is where there is a stable balance of power within the Pashtuns and between the Pashtuns and the others. How can we achieve that?Alexhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17153530634675543954noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-86821825362540480712009-03-02T04:14:00.000+01:002009-03-02T04:14:00.000+01:00I would very much like to know why you assume that...I would very much like to know why you assume that I haven't read the paper. I must come across as uninformed, ignorant, or lazy. That's certainly not my intention, and in my own self-interest as someone with no small on-line footprint and a modest professional reputation that I would like to preserve, I would appreciate it if you'd tell me exactly what I've done to give you that impression.<BR/><BR/>For what little it's worth, my interest in Afghan issues is professional. I have, in fact, read that paper. Among quite a bit of other material. Which doesn't make me an area expert, of course, just somebody who's gotten involved in assessing the Afghan situation. <BR/><BR/>It seems as though you believe that current tactics are counterproductive. Me too. The problem, as I've said before, is that I don't see how you can switch to building up the Afghan armed forces and switch to a population-protection strategy without a fairly large increase in the interim number of ground forces. If you disagree with that assessment, I would like to know why.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-54141045687609950182009-03-01T23:38:00.000+01:002009-03-01T23:38:00.000+01:00Perhaps you should read the US Army FMSO paper? It...Perhaps you should read the US Army FMSO paper? <BR/><BR/>It's necessary to a) really work on the Afghan forces, which implies looking at them as they are, b) make it clear that the current elite can't rely on permanent support, c) redeploy to hold the bulk of the population, e) minimise the violence. Getting away from the Wedding Party Airraid/Inflation Spending/Convoy Guard culture is either the first 80% or the first 20% but either way it's the first..Alexhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17153530634675543954noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-70051571630662133052009-03-01T19:54:00.000+01:002009-03-01T19:54:00.000+01:00I'm really not sure where you're going with this, ...I'm really not sure where you're going with this, Alex. The idea that success means standing up an Afghan government that can defend itself isn't new. Nor is the idea that we'll need to talk to the Taliban and other anti-government forces. The new thing that you <I>seem</I> to be proposing is that NATO should start withdrawing its uniformed personnel right now, but I'm not sure of even that.<BR/><BR/>I apologize. It's not meant as an attack. I just honestly don't see what the here is here, just as I didn't over with your AFOE post.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com