tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post2180811927151176150..comments2023-10-24T10:09:22.146+01:00Comments on The Yorkshire Ranter: Myths of the Falklands: Number 1, CommandAlexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17153530634675543954noreply@blogger.comBlogger11125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-69330297706885615662010-12-06T00:34:30.031+01:002010-12-06T00:34:30.031+01:00That was quite important to the army's decisio...That was quite important to the army's decisions, IIRC. Unfortunately, if I'd said that no bugger would have known what I was talking about. There are a hell of a lot of battles that are named after somewhere that isn't very near where the action was.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-60945968743829656062010-12-05T20:37:25.243+01:002010-12-05T20:37:25.243+01:00How many times does it need to be said, the disast...How many times does it need to be said, the disaster was not at Bluff Cove, but in Port Pleasant off the settlement of Fitzroy?<br />It doetn't have the same ring to it but that's where it was. Bluff Cove is a shallow inlet accessible only to landing craft, not ships. Look at a map.Apprenticehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05491401303435681944noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-78921289604968983742007-05-01T15:18:00.000+01:002007-05-01T15:18:00.000+01:00Dan: I know that Clausewitz also had some interest...Dan: I know that Clausewitz also had some interesting ideas about limited war, but the message that got taken home the most was the schwerpunkt, concentration in space and time, and the decisive battle. I just find it interesting that Nelson came up with something similar at the same time independently.Alexhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17153530634675543954noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-12556899580976411542007-04-30T16:38:00.000+01:002007-04-30T16:38:00.000+01:00The Belgrano loss had the decisive effect of forci...The Belgrano loss had the decisive effect of forcing the Arg Navy to return to port. Having lost a flagship they were not about to lose more warships. It would threaten the balance of power between them and Chile.<BR/><BR/>In my researches into the conflict I have begun to understand how important the role of Chile was as an existential threat to Argentina. British taskforces may come and go but Chile will always be there, an everpresent foe.<BR/><BR/>Chile and Argentina had almost gone to war in 1978 over the Beagle Channel. Shooting between naval taskforces was only prevented by the last minute intervention of Jimmy Carter and a Papal envoy. But that near-thing meant the Argentines entered the Falklands war with the perception that they were sandwiched between the Royal Navy and their old enemy, Pinochet's Chile.<BR/><BR/>It was a war the Arg Junta hadn't expected--particularly the Army and Navy who had vigorously promoted the invasion. A flaccid and discredited Britain was supposed to roll over and give up the Malvinas. But now the British were steaming down armed for bear and were fully capable of knocking the Navy's teeth out.<BR/><BR/>The problem for any would-be military dictator is that your ability to rule is dependant on maintaining the security of the state. If you can't do that, you are sunk, politically. In this regard a Junta is more brittle than a democracy. The stakes are high. You cannot rule unless you can maintain the military as a force in being. The military is the centre of gravity of a military state.<BR/><BR/>This explains many of the apparently odd decisions the Argentines made. It explains why ill-equipped conscript brigades were sent to defend the islands rather than the well-trained and equipped mountain brigades in the Andes. It explains why Grupo 8--the only Air Force unit with all-weather interceptors--was withdrawn to patrol the Chilean border after suffering losses in the early days of the air war. And it explains why the Argentine Navy never sortied in strength again after 1 May. All of these decisions were calculated to preserve the vital strength of the military.<BR/><BR/>In some regards, the forces assigned to the Malvinas/Falklands were a gamble. The Junta hoped they could inflict sufficient hurt on the British to bring them to the negotiating table. However, once the Belgrano proved how vulnerable the fleet was there would be no decisive intervention by the navy. To do so would risk breaking the back of the military, provoking an opportunist Chile into intervention and destroying the Junta's power.<BR/><BR/>In the event, the Junta miscalculated twice. Not only did it lose the islands, but that loss in itself proved sufficient to bring the Junta down.<BR/><BR/>Post-war, we saw Thatcher do everything in her power to laud Pinochet for his supporting role against the Argentines, even to the point of going to bat for him while he was under house arrest in Britain. An evil old butcher he may have been, but his role in winning the war, simply maintaining a threat on Argentina's western flank, is undeniable.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-69263816550291314382007-04-30T14:54:00.000+01:002007-04-30T14:54:00.000+01:00NB: Galahad wasn't actually sunk at the time: she ...NB: Galahad wasn't actually sunk at the time: she was totally unusable, burnt out in the water, and I think was sunk as a war grave post-conflict. 'Destroyed', in short.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-51994528646004986102007-04-30T14:48:00.000+01:002007-04-30T14:48:00.000+01:00Harrowell: 'Er, no. Air defence of the San Carlos ...Harrowell: 'Er, no. Air defence of the San Carlos AOA (later TA) was a responsibility of the Amphibious Group...'<BR/>Well of course tasking was handled by one of the frigates not by Hermes, but Woodward was the man responsible for keeping a fleet more-or-less in being so that there were enough frigates and destroyers plus carrier-based aircraft to provide air defence and also deter any further surface attack. <BR/> <BR/>You've also failed to mention that HMS Spartan did actually locate the Arg aircraft carrier before the attack on Belgrano but was ordered not to sink it by London (Nott claiming credit in his memoirs). <BR/><BR/>A more serious criticism of your post is that we now know that the entire Arg surface fleet turned tail and ran after the Belgrano went down. Woodward didn't and couldn't know that.<BR/><BR/>Hence he had to plan, if at all possible, to destroy all or most of the Arg surface fleet. he didn't know that the Arg navy commanders would make him a gift-wrapped present of victory in the surface war.<BR/><BR/>Re ECMs, four UK warships (2 destroyers, 2 frigates) went down, plus the Galahad and the Atlantic Conveyor. Glasgow had to return to the UK with a UXB, and my mate John, on board. I'll look up the proportion that were destroyed by iron bombs and the proportion by guided munitions, but the proposition that better ECMs would have reduced the number of British sinkings is utterly uncontroversial. And- to reiterate- we nearly damn lost that war. A couple more sunk ships, or another ten days at sea, and we would have done. <BR/><BR/>...And have you actually read Clausewitz? It's been radio silence on that one.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-529222966180666782007-04-30T14:14:00.000+01:002007-04-30T14:14:00.000+01:00largely responsible for the successful Air Defence...<EM>largely responsible for the successful Air Defence (since the Army and Royal Marine SAMs were so pitifully inadequate).</EM><BR/><BR/>Er, no. Air defence of the San Carlos AOA (later TA) was a responsibility of the Amphibious Group, controlled on day 1 by <EM>Antrim</EM>, later by <EM>Broadsword</EM> and then <EM>Minerva</EM>.<BR/><BR/>Which ECM would have helped <EM>Coventry</EM>? She was sunk by iron bombs.Alexhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17153530634675543954noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-3528756113259668312007-04-30T13:33:00.000+01:002007-04-30T13:33:00.000+01:00The stuff about Woodward just smacks of making a c...The stuff about Woodward just smacks of making a controversy up out of whole cloth. Woodward, as you fail to mention, estimated on the day of the Argentine surrender that he could keep his (remaining) ships seaworthy for a maximum of ten days, probably less. (Source: 'A hundred days', his memoirs; but this is also backed up in most secondary sources, eg most recently Hugo Bicheno's 'Razor's Edge.) He HAD to win the war as rapidly as possible because after a short time General Winter would win it for the Argentinians. This nearly happened. <BR/><BR/>Woodward was certainly a pretty graceless individual who offended Thompson and Clapp. But the Argentinian navy never seriously interfered with Clapp's amphibious operation, and the Arg Air Force did to a much lesser degree than might have been expected. Woodward's ship were totally responsible for fighting off the Arg navy, largely responsible for the successful Air Defence (since the Army and Royal Marine SAMs were so pitifully inadequate). Woodward himself was not to blame at all for the various Arg Air Force victories: the destruction of various Type 42 frigates was down to Denis Healey's decision to skimp on 'expensive' Electronic Counter-Measures when commissioning them (source: Bicheno, following many before him) and the screw-up at Bluff Cove was a mixture of the foolishness of the Chiefs of Staff in London, the idiot commander of 5 Brigade, Wilson, and the even more foolish Welsh Guards company commander who recklessly ignored the advice of the leading Royal Marines amphibious warfare expert, Ewen Southby-Tailyour, to disembark his men. <BR/><BR/>Nul points for Harrowell on Woodward...And if you think Clausewitz always and everywhere advocated the battle of annihilation, have you actually read him? At least go through Michael Howard's short book- and never, ever trust John Keegan, who quite clearly hasn't read Clausewitz.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-18594077646964955152007-04-30T10:59:00.000+01:002007-04-30T10:59:00.000+01:00test test testThis is Dan Hardie, not the other an...test test test<BR/>This is Dan Hardie, not the other and rather tech-smarter comments Dan...Danhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09472772534428182273noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-56502538558437262292007-04-29T14:09:00.000+01:002007-04-29T14:09:00.000+01:00Yes.(insert shudder here)Yes.<BR/><BR/>(insert shudder here)Alexhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17153530634675543954noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5467119.post-9617674812817793632007-04-29T14:04:00.000+01:002007-04-29T14:04:00.000+01:00Hrm - on sending two resource ships+landing ship t...Hrm - on sending two resource ships+landing ship towards the mainland. <BR/><BR/>Was he seriously of the view that a credible feint was to threaten a land incursion on the Argentinian mainland?chris stileshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16220270505988683271noreply@blogger.com